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This paper investigates the phenomenon of persistent macroeconomic 
divergence that has occurred across the eurozone in recent years. Optimal 
currency area theory would point toward asymmetric shocks and structural 
factors as the foremost candidate causes. The alternative hypothesis pursued 
here focuses on the working of the Maastricht regime itself, making it clear that 
the regime features powerful built-in destabilizers that foster divergence as well 
as fragility. Supposed adjustment mechanisms actually have turned out to 
undermine the operation of the currency union by making it less “optimal,” that 
is, less subject to a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy and common nominal 
exchange rate, in view of the resulting business cycle desynchronization and 
related build-up of financial imbalances. The threats of fragility and divergence 
reinforce each other. Without regime reform these developments could 
potentially spiral out of control, threatening the long-term survival of EMU. 
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This paper investigates the phenomenon of persistent macroeconomic divergence that 
has occurred across the Euro area in the fragile macroeconomic environment of recent 
years. Optimal currency area theory would point toward asymmetric shocks and 
structural factors as the foremost candidate causes. The alternative hypothesis pursued 
here focuses on the working of the Maastricht regime itself, highlighting that the 
regime features powerful built in destabilizers that foster divergence as well as 
fragility. Supposed adjustment mechanisms have turned out to actually undermine the 
operation of the currency union by making it ever less “optimal,” that is, less 
subjectable to a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy and common nominal exchange 
rate in view of the resulting business cycle de-synchronization and related build up of 
financial imbalances.  
  The issue of divergence across the eurozone has gained some prominence in 
recent years. Often attention is primarily focused on inflation differentials, which are 
however not necessarily judged undesirable. For instance, in its May Bulletin of 2005, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) observed that: 
 
“Inflation differentials can be an integral part of the adjustment mechanism resulting from 
dispersion of economic developments across the participating countries, a mechanism which in 
turn reflects the impact of various economic shocks as well as the fact that the economic 
structures in place vary from country to country. Inflation differentials are, then, the product of an 
equilibrating adjustment process within a monetary union and, as such, are not only unavoidable, 
but also desirable. At the same time, lasting inflation differentials in the euro area are, to some 
extent, also a product of misaligned fiscal policies, diverging wage developments and deep-seated 
structural inefficiencies such as nominal and real rigidities in product and factor markets” (ECB 
2005, May MB, p. 61).  
 
Note that inflation differentials are seen here as part of an equilibrating adjustment 
mechanism featuring wage and price flexibility. And a related issue is that structural 
reforms enhancing flexibility are then seen as bolstering the working of these 
supposedly equilibrating forces. By contrast, the analysis here will pinpoint that 
powerful forces of divergence triggered in the process are ignored in the official 
flexibility doctrine and that substituting structural reform and flexibility for proper 
demand management is doomed to failure.   
The analysis starts in section 2 with the ill-conceived “convergence process” 
of the 1990s. Developments since the euro’s launch are the subject of section 3.   2
Section 4 then turns to optimum currency area theory for advice on the issue of 
divergence within currency areas. A thorough analysis of the “competitiveness 
channel,” the various forces of divergence kicked off thereby, and their joint effect on 
internal economic stability of individual member states is provided in section 5. The 
accompanying build-up of intra-eurozone imbalances is the subject of section 6, 
which also identifies the key flaws in the reasoning behind the official flexibility 
doctrine. Section 7 concludes the analysis and offers recommendations for regime 
reform targeting the divergence issue. 
 
2. DIVERGENCE DURING THE “CONVERGENCE PROCESS” OF THE 
1990S  
 
Before setting out to investigate the phenomenon of persistent divergence in inflation 
and economic activity across Euroland since 1999 two issues require prior 
clarification. One concerns the catching-up process of lower-income EU members 
with their higher-income partners. Another is that persistent inflation differentials and 
cyclical divergence are not new phenomena in Europe.  
As to the first, growth theory would lead one to expect that, for instance, the 
latecomers in Europe’s south, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, just like the new EU 
members in Europe’s east, will grow faster than the “old EU core” for as long as their 
catching up and real convergence to a supposedly common (long-run) growth trend is 
taking place. Essentially, this can be thought of as an equilibrium phenomenon during 
which both higher and lower-income countries can grow at their respective potential 
trend rates. And long-run catching up is not the issue in what follows. Instead, at issue 
are pronounced out-of-sync deviations from steady-state growth and persistent 
inflation differentials not attributable to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. In principle, 
cyclical divergences can get either amplified or effectively counterbalanced, and by 
either market mechanisms and/or stabilizing policies.  
In actual fact, pronounced cyclical divergences much characterized the 
situation since 2001. In particular, while domestic demand and economic activity in 
Germany has remained severely depressed, France fared significantly better until 
recently, and Spain experienced boom conditions throughout. In other words, while 
Germany has suffered from protracted cyclical slack, Spain enjoyed sustained above-
trend growth, with France and Italy falling somewhere in between. Similarly,   3
persistent inflation differentials remain in place, with Germany well below and Italy 
and Spain well above the eurozone average. Among smaller countries Portugal and 
the Netherlands have been persistent laggards and Ireland and Greece persistent star 
performers. The point is that for members of a common currency area such a lack of 
synchronization of business cycles can represent a serious problem since the common 
monetary policy stance and external exchange rate tend to become increasingly less 
“optimal” the further member countries are drifting apart.  
  And this leads to the second issue, the fact that cyclical divergence and 
persistent inflation differentials are not new phenomena in Europe at all, but 
characterized the whole post-war era up to EMU too. In the past, such diverging 
trends led to external imbalances and periodic exchange rate adjustments or crises. 
These were however always considered a threat to the common market and further 
economic integration, which is exactly why Europe undertook a fresh attempt at 
creating a “zone of monetary stability” in the late 1970s (the EMS), and then 
embarked on the common currency project in the late 1980s (EMU). EMU was 
supposed to ban forever the possibility of competitive devaluations that could disturb 
or even undermine the common market and European integration more generally.  
However, by the time this was agreed upon in the early 1990s Europe suffered 
from very severe divergences indeed, both in inflation and economic activity. It was 
to prepare the launching of the common currency into a more stable environment that 
a period of convergence was prescribed to precede the euro’s introduction. The 
Maastricht Treaty features certain criteria that countries had to fulfil in order to be 
allowed into the club. These criteria set limits for inflation, nominal interest rates, 
nominal exchange rate changes, and public finances; apart from requiring the release 
into independence of national central banks before merging them into the Eurosystem.  
  As it turns out, actual occurrences over the 1990s foretold many of the 
problems that countries were to experience under EMU conditions more recently too. 
While inflation and nominal interest rates generally fell to common and low levels 
and budget deficits declined to just below 3 percent of GDP by 1997-98, too, 
developments in the real economy during the 1990s were anything but harmonious 
(Arestis and Sawyer 2001).  
The decade started out in 1990 with what represented a sizeable asymmetric 
shock hitting the anchor currency. In Germany’s case, unification extended the 
belated boom that had reached the country only by 1988, after subdued growth ever   4
since the early 1980s recession. Among other things, Germany’s miraculous four-year 
span of high growth at stable and low inflation paid put to the popular contemporary 
view that Germany was suffering from all-pervasive structural problems that 
prevented it from growing. By contrast, and despite export spill-overs from 
Germany’s so-called unification boom, much of the rest of Europe was facing 
stagnation if not outright recessionary conditions by that time.  
  This marked de-synchronization of business cycle conditions, together with 
the Bundesbank’s extraordinarily tight money course embarked upon in 1991, led up 
to the ERM crises of 1992/93. The sizeable devaluations “suffered” by many satellite 
currencies vis-à-vis the deutschmark in these events corrected for Germany’s creeping 
competitiveness gains that had accumulated during the “hard EMS” period. While it 
would thus be wrong to conclude that Germany had to restore its competitiveness lost 
through these events, their impact no doubt represented the first source of subsequent 
divergence, with competitiveness gains boosting exports in countries like Italy and 
Spain, but having the opposite impact on Germany. The loss of Germany’s previous 
(undervaluation) advantage was one of two main factors that reversed the direction of 
diverging trends over the course of the 1990s: Germany had started out as the 
strongest economy in Europe when the common currency was agreed upon, but 
turned out to be its weakest when the euro was actually launched. 
The turning point occurred around the middle of the decade. By that time, 
however, all of “Euroland to be” found itself in the doldrums. It is worthwhile to 
recall here that even in mid1997 it appeared that only a very small group of countries 
would qualify for an early euro adoption. The fiscal contractions inflicted upon 
Europe at the time – although at varying degrees and timings – proved rather less 
expansionary than its propagators had promised they would. Accompanied by the 
Bundesbank’s conspicuous reluctance to ease policy, referring to a stability-oriented 
need for a “steady hand” policy, an argument never heard of when the bank envisions 
reasons to hike rates, the predictable consequence was subdued growth. 
Luckily, the United States’ “new economy” boom and associated U.S. dollar 
strength provided a last-minute lifeline to the struggling EU economies; just in time 
for the “convergence test” of spring 1998 leading to a broad EMU after all.  
  Luck proved short-lived though as the Asian and Russian crises soon after 
delivered a sizeable external demand shock. Germany was especially hard hit because 
already at that point the country had become overly reliant on export-driven growth.   5
In Germany, domestic demand failed to ever recover from the Bundesbank’s tight 
money crusade that accompanied the severe and procyclical fiscal contraction 
between 1992 and 1997 – an exceptionally (and counterproductively!) tight macro 
policy stance that diverged from the situation in much of the rest of Europe.  
For one thing, other countries like France, Spain, and Austria for instance, 
wisely delayed the bulk of their fiscal consolidation efforts until the worst was over, 
thereby avoiding the strongly procylical impact that characterized Germany’s 
situation. For another, the years 1996-98 saw non-deutschmark interest rates across 
Europe converge (i.e. decline) to German levels, traditionally the European interest 
rate floor (except for the Swiss franc) related to Germany’s EMS lead role. To this 
decline in interest rates corresponds a rise in asset prices, with strong credit growth 
boosting domestic demand during the adjustment process.  
In summary, cyclical divergences during the 1990s occurred primarily 
between Germany on the one hand and former EMS-satellite countries on the other. 
These developments were inevitable only in the sense and to the extent that the 
deutschmark had been undervalued prior to the ERM crises and Germany bound to 
lose its former (key currency) interest-rate bonus with the launch of the common 
currency. Until that time Germany was perfectly free to compensate for these factors 
though. In particular, there was nothing to stop the relevant German authorities from 
conducting less inappropriate macroeconomic policies. For one thing, the Bundesbank 
was still in charge of German monetary policy and charged with a German mandate. 
For another, it was quite unnecessary to inflict a fiscal contraction upon Germany that 
lacked any historical parallel in the developed world. Behind all this was a deliberate 
abstention on the part of Germany’s key authorities to address the problem of 
protracted domestic demand stagnation. Since the 1980s a peculiar “structuralist” (or, 
“supply-side-only”) view is running high in German policymaking circles.  
In the event, having lost both its former competitive advantages during the 
run-up to EMU, the DM undervaluation that had been accumulated during the hard 
EMS era as well as its traditional (key currency) interest-rate bonus, Germany was in  
poor shape to cope with the Asian and Russian crises that hit at the very time when 
Germany finally surrendered its monetary policy sovereignty too. It so happened that 
Germany became quickly dubbed the “sick man of the euro” when the new currency 
started on its steep decline in 1999 in view of a perceived growth disadvantage 
compared to the roaring United States economy. In retrospect, one is truly taken   6
aback by the degree of ineptness that characterized the German authorities’ macro 
policy response to the unification challenge by means of which the Western German 
economy has been lastingly derailed – until today (Bibow 2005).  
 
3. AFTER BRIEFLY ABATING EARLY ON, DIVERGENCE HAS QUICKLY 
RE-EMERGED WITH PROTRACTED STAGNATION SINCE THE 2001 
DOWNTURN  
 
Between two long spans of subdued growth or near stagnation Germany actually 
experienced a brief burst of growth, starting in mid1999 and lasting for a bit over a 
year. After the export slump of 1998-99, exports recovered strongly, amplified by the 
euro’s plunge. Moreover, as fiscal consolidation briefly paused domestic demand 
growth accelerated to an annual rate of 2.5 percent in 1999–2000, so that real GDP 
growth reached a remarkable 3.5 percent pace in 2000.    
Unfortunately, however, the euro’s plunge also magnified the rise in oil prices 
and lifted import prices more generally, which pushed headline HICP inflation above 
the ECB’s declared two-percent ceiling by mid 2000. Importantly, while the strength 
of these price effects differed significantly across Europe, core inflation remained 
very low and showed relatively little dispersion at the time.  
  Things have changed again with the return of subdued growth since 2001, as, 
for instance, a report prepared in 2003 by the Monetary Policy Committee of the 
Eurosystem observed that:  
 
“With the exception of Luxembourg, Belgium and Finland, all countries have experienced 
inflation persistently above or below the euro area average since 1999 … A related issue is that 
differences in the evolution of inflation among the three largest euro area countries appear to have 
increasingly diverged since 2002. Despite the common slowdown in economic activity 
experienced by France, Italy and Germany, and notwithstanding the relatively similar cyclical 
positions of the latter two countries, inflation in core HICP components in Germany declined 
throughout 2002, whereas it was more or less flat in France and increased in Italy” (ECB 2003,  
p. 7).  
 
It is of great interest that this report refers to a “common slowdown in economic 
activity” and to core rather than headline inflation. For the issue is barely discernable 
from the evolution of the dispersion in headline inflation across all euro area countries 
shown in Figure 1. Measured by the (unweighted) standard deviation of the ECB’s   7
chosen inflation index, dispersion has stayed fairly stable throughout. 










































































































































































































































































Yet, as the above report suggests and Figure 2 confirms, persistent inflation 
differentials have characterized developments in core prices in the largest eurozone 
economies. Spain was added to the analysis here despite not being fully comparable 
with “the big three,” given its remaining scope for catch up with the core countries in 
terms of income levels. Spain may be even less comparable with the smaller eurozone 
economies though, for which the argument developed here applies less fully.  
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The key feature emerging from Figure 2 is the decline in German (market-
determined)
1 core inflation to close to zero, while price trends in the other countries 
have been running at significantly higher levels until today.  
The underlying reason for this divergence in core inflation can be seen in 
Figure 3, which shows that German wage inflation declined to zero by 2005, with 
annual rates between 2.5-3.5 percent for the other three countries. This is a rather 
crucial fact in view of the proposition that flexible wages and prices can and should 
provide a key adjustment mechanism in EMU; to be discussed further below.  
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Source. OECD Economic Outlook no. 78 (Dec 05)































Turning to real divergence, the evolution of the dispersion of real GDP growth 
rates for the four largest eurozone members since 1988 provides a summary indicator. 
Figure 4 confirms that economies were severely out-of-sync around German 
unification in 1990. The subsequent decline in growth dispersion in the first half of 
the 1990s reflected the common recession of 1993 and the subdued growth that 
followed. The supposed convergence process then saw a sharp rise in dispersion in the 
second half of the 1990s, driven by those forces of divergence discussed further 
above. This trend was only reversed after the start of EMU with the brief common 
                                                 
1 Apart from energy, food, alcohol and tobacco, this measure of core inflation also excludes the 
(approximated) price effects of “tax-push,” i.e., hikes in indirect taxes and administered prices. See 
Bibow 2006a.    9
boom in 2000. Since 2001, however, real divergence is on the rise again. 
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The overall magnitude of real divergence at issue here is reflected in Figure 5, 
showing the cumulative GDP growth differentials since 2001 as well as the respective 
cumulative net trade contributions to GDP growth over this period. While Spain’s 
superior performance may partly reflect catch up, this case can hardly be made for 
France growing so much faster than Germany and Italy. As to the composition of 
GDP growth, note that Germany’s growth over this period was driven more than 
exclusively by foreign trade! This is another crucial fact in view of the proposition 
that flexible wages and prices should provide the key adjustment mechanism in EMU. 
Figure 5. Cumulative GDP growth and its composition (2001-2005)
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4. REVISITING OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA (OCA) THEORY  
 
The issue of persistent divergence is important to EMU since member states have 
surrendered their ability to use national monetary and exchange rate policies to deal 
with it individually, while the common “one-size-fits-all” policy stance decided for 
them as a group actually becomes ever less fitting the more they drift apart. Worst, if 
such drift became self-reinforcing. Best, if automatic market mechanisms alone re-
equilibrated the system. For the sustainability of EMU it is a vital matter whether 
market forces alone can be relied upon as drivers of supposedly equilibrating 
adjustment processes, or what role deliberate policies might have to play in all this.  
Traditionally, this issue has been at the very heart of “optimum currency area” 
theory (OCA). Starting in the context of the fixed-versus-flexible-exchange-rates 
debate of the 1960s, OCA has identified certain properties that members of a currency 
union should possess to make the union function in a sustainable fashion. The central 
idea is that the more these properties were shared by all members, the more this would 
tend to reduce the need and usefulness of nominal exchange rate adjustments in 
achieving internal and external balance; namely, by reducing the likelihood and 
impact of certain types of shocks and/or in facilitating adjustment thereafter. On the 
basis of OCA, what was to be expected for Euroland?  
  Mundell’s (1961) starting point was that real world economies might lack the 
degree of price and wage flexibility which neoclassical theory postulates would assure 
a quick convergence back toward equilibrium, following shocks. The kind of shocks 
Mundell focussed on where asymmetric demand shocks, with demand shifting away 
from the products of one country towards those of another. Notice here that overall 
aggregate demand in the two countries together is not the issue. Rather, whereas one 
country suffers from a slump, the other experiences overheating. With wages and 
prices falling in the former while rising in the latter, or at least the relative pace of 
wage and price changes diverging appropriately, competitiveness of the two countries 
would adjust in ways that tend to restore both full employment as well as external 
equilibrium in both countries, and in a mutually beneficial way too.  
  As alternative adjustment mechanisms and criteria for evaluating the fitness 
for currency union membership, Mundell and later contributors to OCA emphasized: 
factor mobility, fiscal policy, diversified industry structures, openness and trade 
relations, and financial integration. All along, the key question was how useful and   11
effective national exchange rate and monetary policies might be in the event of 
asymmetric shocks, given certain properties of the economies involved. More 
recently, the idea has gained ground that the rather static OCA perspective on the 
matter may be misleading if establishing a monetary union itself tends to align 
countries more closely together in relevant respects, so that “optimality” of currency 
areas features important elements of endogeneity. As a summary measure of OCA 
wisdom (or, “meta-criterion”), business cycle synchronicity comes top.
2    
  At least until recently, in applying OCA to EMU in Europe, there was never 
any question that wage and price flexibility might ever be sufficient to assure short-
run stabilization. And, arguably, no real world economy really fulfils what seems to 
be required along these lines anyway; leaving aside for the moment Keynes’s (1936) 
fundamental reservations against this supposed route of macroeconomic adjustment. 
Instead, labor mobility featured most prominently as a potential alternative, although 
empirical studies always found Europe lagging the United States in this respect.  
Be that as it may, given that the EU features “cohesion” and “solidarity” 
among its long-term goals, and uses regional policies to prevent regions from falling 
further behind, it would seem that large-scale permanent migration is not desired in 
the EU anyway. Moreover, as to the more relevant short-run too, labor mobility can 
hardly play more than a fairly limited role, given the immense costs involved in 
temporarily resettling families across the continent.  
  Mobility of capital in the form of real capital investment, on the other hand, 
has never really been seen as a major adjustment mechanism. Packing up factory 
plants and shuffling them across the continent is an unlikely event, especially for 
cyclical reasons. Similarly, running down existing real capital in one place, while 
starting afresh elsewhere, does not look like a viable strategy for short-run adjustment 
either. This is especially so as depressed regions are rarely seen as the location to be 
by Greenfield investors. Also, while overcapacities and depressed sales and profit 
expectations would, if anything, seem to work against the depressed region’s 
attractiveness anyway, financing cost may not be any lower there than elsewhere in 
the monetary union either.  
Things may be different as far as cross-border mergers and acquisitions are 
concerned, since at sale prices troubled local firms in depressed regions might become 
                                                 
2 See De Grauwe and Mongelli 2005 for an overview of OCA.   12
attractive targets for foreign predators. That national authorities may be tempted to 
resist such penetration is one thing. More importantly, the key question is whether 
extensive M&A activities can really be expected to be conducive to stabilization in 
the short run – given the large-scale labor shedding and manifold frictions often 
involved in such scenarios.  
  This leaves mobility of financial capital. And in this area a fairly advanced 
state of financial integration may be attested across Europe with respect to both 
financial intermediaries and markets. Whether the current degree of financial 
integration may be sufficient to deliver much in the form of risk diversification and 
insurance across the union, and whether this can be reasonably expected to be more 
than a minor factor anyway, is one thing. But certainly the financing of soaring intra-
union (current account) imbalances has not yet met any resistance in the financial 
system. The real issue is to what extent the financial system plays any equilibrating 
role or merely facilitates growing divergences, or perhaps even accentuates them. 
Prior to the start of EMU some observers stressed the potential disciplining 
role of financial markets as far as public finances are concerned; with market 
discipline thus seen as a force that may be conducive to securing convergence and 
long-run equilibrium. In practice, with the disappearance of currency risk, sovereign 
credit spreads too have shrunk to very low levels over recent years and only few 
people seem to really expect markets to play any disciplining role at all today. In my 
view, this whole issue pertains to private financial relations within the union just as 
much, if not more, than to any exposure to public debt.  
Yet, given a common monetary policy stance, to what extent can the financial 
system be expected to play any stabilizing role, tightening financial conditions in 
booming countries, easing them in depressed ones? To my mind it is not clear that 
finance necessarily plays any equilibrating role at all. It even seems possible that the 
financial system might actually amplify divergence apart from facilitating imbalances. 
Today, external imbalances within the eurozone feature both depressed countries 
(Portugal) as well as booming ones (Spain) with large current account deficit 
positions. And the same holds on the surplus side, with Germany and Ireland as 
prominent examples.  
  That leaves us with fiscal policy, stressed by OCA as the key policy 
instrument. The point is though that there is no proper fiscal policy possible at the 
union level as the current degree of fiscal integration is miniscule. Reflecting the   13
hybrid state of political integration, budgets and hence fiscal policy remain under 
national sovereignty. In fact, Goodhart (1998) argues that standard OCA analysis fails 
to appreciate the fundamental “link between political sovereignty and fiscal authority 
on the one hand and money creation … on the other,” emphasizing that EMU in 
Europe represents an “unprecedented divorce between the main monetary and fiscal 
authorities” (p. 3) – with possible side-effects yet to be acknowledged.   
In principle, fiscal policy is the only traditional stabilization policy tool left to 
members of EMU. Remarkably, the Maastricht regime’s designers foresaw neither 
any need to coordinate national fiscal policies, so as to assure an appropriate 
aggregate fiscal stance, nor to establish coordination with other policy areas so as to 
assure an appropriate mix of policies at any time. German policy wisdom suggested 
that policy responsibilities be kept clearly separate and monetary policy independent 
from any political control and accountability at all costs.
3 
While predictably detrimental for aggregate stability in the union, one might at 
first even see some virtue in this non-coordination as far as the flexibility of national 
fiscal policies in coping with the key OCA concern of asymmetric shocks and 
business cycle asynchronicity across the union is concerned. In practice, however, 
EMU in Europe was designed primarily with a view of disciplining national fiscal 
policies, which gave rise to the institutionalized fiscal straightjacket erroneously 
labelled “Stability and Growth Pact.” While the idea was to establish a more or less 
automatic, rule-based fiscal regime that relies on the free working of built-in fiscal 
stabilizers only, this pact is unlikely to deliver on either stability or growth. 
Some of the most serious flaws in this dysfunctional fiscal regime stem from 
the unwarranted presumptions that the supposed budgetary equilibrium (i.e. a budget 
that is in balance or surplus) has already been achieved at the outset and that adverse 
conditions would never be severe enough to actually trigger the procyclical 
discretionary measures that breaching the three-percent deficit limit legally calls for.  
In the event, EMU started with an aggregate budget position that fell well 
short of its supposed equilibrium position.
4 The slowdown of 2001 and protracted 
stagnation that followed then provided the very kind of adverse conditions which the 
                                                 
3 On the design of the Maastricht regime and critiques thereof see: Allsopp and Vines 1998, Bibow 
2001, Dyson and Featherstone 1999, and Tietmeyer 1991. 
4 And contrary to popularly held beliefs, this was not due to insufficient ambitiousness in the run-up to 
EMU, but subdued GDP growth; which itself was at least partly the result of the counterproductive 
approach to fiscal consolidation followed during the 1990s.   14
pact was not designed to cope with. After quickly exhausting the rather limited fiscal 
leeway available according to the rules, procyclical discretionary consolidation 
attempts characterized the true working of the “Instability and Stagnation Pact” 
(Bibow 2001), further destabilizing the respective countries and the eurozone.  
Arguably, this situation arose because the only stabilization policy instrument 
fully available in the eurozone, monetary policy, failed to stem the plight. Although 
Horst Koehler was merely spelling out textbook wisdom, it is worthwhile to recall 
here the IMF Chairman’s reminder issued to the ECB in 2002 that “monetary policy 
[was] the first line of defence”. Remarkably, ECB president Duisenberg responded 
that “he had never heard of that” (WSJE 2002).  
  In summary, it was quite clear from the start what is and what is not to be 
expected in the eurozone in terms of OCA adjustment mechanisms. And in view of 
actual developments since 1999 there have not been any real surprises at this front 
either. What is surprising, then, is that the thoroughly disillusioning experiences with 
the working of the ill-designed Maastricht regime have given rise to a remarkably 
hypocritical defense against the regime’s urgently needed reform. Today, and quite in 
conflict with the previous OCA focus, official doctrine is to put all the emphasis on 
the supposedly self-equilibrating role of wage and price flexibility; to be augmented 
not by demand-side (stabilization) policies, but supply-side (structural) reforms of 
market institutions that enhance allegedly lacking market “flexibility.” The supposed 
flexibility ideal Euroland is aiming for may not exist anywhere on this planet. But 
hypocrisy and denial still prevent a sober assessment of the fact that the United States 
and UK, for instance, use demand management policies to stabilize their respective 
economies.  
The next section analyzes whether the peculiarly one-sided policy approach 
favored in Euroland due to German power might not only fail to deliver stability and 
growth, but could actually foster divergence at the same time as well.   
 
5. ALL BETS ON THE “COMPETITIVENESS CHANNEL”: EXPLAINING 
DIVERGENCE AS CAUSED BY THE WORKING OF THE MAASTRICHT 
REGIME  
 
The proposition that wage and price flexibility, accompanied by structural reforms 
that further enhance the flexible working of product and labor markets, play a key role   15
in fostering convergence and the smooth functioning of EMU was most clearly 
expressed by the ECB in the quotation in the introductory section above. The ECB 
refers there to inflation differentials as a “desirable” product of an “equilibrating 
adjustment process” within a monetary union (cf. ECB 2005, May Bulletin, p. 61). 
And, as an institution supposedly charged with the allegedly purely technical task of 
monetary policy that appears to justify its political independence, the ECB never tires 
of calling for reforms eliminating structural inefficiencies that allegedly give rise to 
undesirable inflation differentials.  
A vital implication is that adjustment to shocks is supposed to work primarily 
through changes in competitiveness, featuring net exports as a key pull or drag factor 
on GDP growth. Indeed, the ECB is very optimistic on the effectiveness of this 
supposed equilibrating adjustment mechanism, asserting that the “competitiveness 
(“real exchange rate”) channel, although slow to build up, eventually becomes the 
dominating adjustment factor” (ECB 2005, May Bulletin, p. 77). Similarly, the OECD 
(2004; emphasis added) observed that “in the absence of monetary policy instruments, 
and with the leeway for fiscal policy also limited, adjustment will have to relay on 
changes in external competitiveness operating through wages and prices.” 
  The “there-is-no-alternative” claim is always easily made. But developments 
since 2001 have provided an interesting experiment along these lines. It is thus 
appropriate to scrutinize the outcomes. Certainly wage and price developments 
between Germany and Spain have moved in accordance with the above proposition. 
Wage and (core) price inflation have fallen to historically low levels in stagnant 
Germany, but stayed at well above eurozone average levels in booming Spain, with 
France falling somewhere in between as regards both inflation and growth 
performance and Italy as something of an outlier (featuring relatively high wage and 
price inflation despite even worse performance than Germany since 2004).  
The idea is that these developments would tend to drive diverging eurozone 
countries back to their converging steady-state growth paths. Alas, it is overlooked 
that important forces of divergence are also at work that actually amplify rather than 
counterbalance growth and inflation divergences. These are summarized in Figure 6, 
contrasting stagnant Germany and booming Spain.    16
 
Given the budgetary consequences of protracted stagnation versus protracted 
boom conditions, the SGP’s inherent asymmetry provides a first important amplifier. 
For in booming Spain the SGP does not provide any effective discipline at all. In fact, 
Spain can even employ its favorable budgetary position to further stimulate domestic 
demand.
5 In depressed Germany, by contrast, the deflationary bias in the SGP springs 
to life as stagnation leads to a breach of the three-percent deficit limit (or threatens to 
do so), triggering procyclical discretionary consolidation attempts.   
  Further forces of divergence feature wages and prices themselves. Although 
diverging in their supposed way, the hoped-for equilibrating adjustment role of 
flexible wages and prices actually amplifies cyclical divergence at the domestic front, 
both directly and indirectly. To begin with, solid wage growth (apart from labor 
market strength and job security) directly bolsters private consumption in the 
booming economy, whereas wage moderation (apart from labor market weakness and 
widespread job fears) by depressing disposable incomes of wage earners further 
undermines private consumption in the depressed economy. In this context, 
                                                 
5 In fact, Spain’s finance minister Pedro Solbes plans tax cuts for 2007 in the order of magnitude of 0.5 
percent of GDP – the “magic number” the same man asked “SGP sinners” like stagnant Germany to at 
least impose on their economies in his previous life as EU Commissioner. See Financial Times 
Deutschland 25 January 2006.    17
proponents of structural reform are quick to assert that positive confidence effects can 
easily do the trick and boost growth overall (just as positive confidence effects are 
routinely asserted for fiscal contractions and the ECB’s notorious refusal to easy 
policy). Reality may not comply though. As to labor market reforms, too, German 
experience since 2001 points clearly in the opposite direction.  
At the same time, wage trends are a most powerful force behind inflation 
trends, with further indirect effects. An important factor is that diverging inflation 
trends in a monetary union with common nominal interest rates imply that real 
interest rates can be highest exactly in those countries with already weak economies. 
The real interest rate differentials resulting from a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy 
stance when flexible wages and prices adjust in their supposedly equilibrating ways 
thereby become another force of divergence. The OCA literature features the 
competitiveness channel in reversing the impact of demand-shift shocks, but 
overlooks the interest rate channel operating on domestic demand. The more 
important is domestic as opposed to external demand for the economy at hand, the 
more powerful this force of divergence, too. As a rule, the larger and less open the 
economy, the harder it will be to operate against these domestic forces. This is why 
we concentrate on larger economies here. The forces of divergence are also at work in 
smaller ones, but can be more easily overturned by a net exports boost. 
  Yet, real interest rate differentials are not really the end of the monetary story, 
but the origin of further amplifying factors inherent in the financial system. Relatively 
low real interest rates in buoyant economies with strong domestic demand will tend to 
attract willing (corporate and household) borrowers as well as willing lenders, 
nourishing credit growth and rising asset prices in self-reinforcing ways. By contrast, 
relatively high real interest rates in stagnant economies can arouse the exact opposite 
kind of financial propagation mechanisms in stagnant economies – providing yet 
another important source of divergence.  
  Perhaps the most crucial insight is that these various forces of divergence do 
not operate independently, but reinforce each other. For in each country they all 
operate in one and the same direction. As a result, partners continue drifting apart and 
may get ever further away from re-attaining a balanced position, both individually and 
as a union. Focusing on the internal balance issue up to this point, the analysis will 
now turn to the external part of the supposedly equilibrating adjustment process since 
external imbalances are bound to arise in the process too.     18
 
6. INTRA EURO AREA IMBALANCES SOAR AS MISDIAGNOSIS AND 
FLAWED ADVICE HOLD SWAY 
 
To be sure, diverging wage and price developments are key driving forces behind 
changes in competitiveness and over time impact on trade positions accordingly. The 
ECB (2005) asserts that the competitiveness channel “eventually becomes the 
dominant factor.” The problem is that blind reliance on the competitiveness channel 
alone may not only be ineffective (or worse) in fostering internal balance in the short 
run, i.e. over the cycle, but is causing lasting divergences and the build-up of external 
imbalances too. Especially in large economies reliance on the competitiveness 
channel comes at the price of depressing domestic demand through the various 
operative channels analyzed above. A liberalized and integrated financial system can 
facilitate and accommodate growing (intra-union) “external imbalances” for a long 
time without prompting any self-equilibrating forces. Worse, procyclical propagation 
mechanisms inherent in the financial system can even be a continuing force of 
divergence – up to a point. 
  In section 4 above I emphasized that Germany’s GDP growth since 2001 
derived (more than) exclusively from net trade.
6 In Spain, by contrast, net trade has 
been a persistent sizeable drag on GDP growth, while France and Italy have seen their 
net trade shift from contributor to drag on growth since 1999. Germany’s current 
account surplus is forecast to climb towards 5 percent of GDP this year. The absolute 
swing in its current account balance since 2000 amounts to some $140bn – the largest 
swing in any surplus country in the world. This is not only highly relevant in the 
context of global imbalances, as a good part of the swing in Germany’s trade balance 
occurred within the eurozone – at the detriment of Germany’s European partners. 
                                                 
6 And to the extent that business investment has picked up since 2004 this is concentrated in the export-
oriented sectors too (Loose and Ludwig 2005). Internally, Germany’s beggar-thy-neighbor policies 
have created a truly dual economy together with a heavily shifting income distribution.    19
 
















































































In other words, while Germany’s reliance on the competitiveness channel may 
have backfired internally by depressing its domestic economy, up to this point it has 
clearly worked externally, namely by passing on the buck to those partners that have 
been less negligent with respect to their domestic economies, like France and Italy, 
for instance. And in this way, Germany’s beggar-thy-neighbour strategy can work 
towards convergence, eventually. But convergence toward a depressed level of 
activity it will be if Germany’s weakening partners respond to the rising external drag 
by deflating their economies too; convergence through spreading the German disease.  
Clearly this strategy is self-defeating for the union as a whole and it is thus 
quite astonishing that the euro’s supposed guardians should find so much praise for 
Germany’s pursuits. Essentially, Germany pursues a beggar-thy-neighbor competitive 
devaluation – a strategy that the euro was meant to ban forever.
7  
  Interestingly, the external drag has so far failed to derail Spain’s decade-long 
boom. Spain’s current account deficit is forecast to reach double-digit territory by 
next year. A good part of this deficit is with Spain’s partners in the Euro area, where 
                                                 
7 A popular – albeit thoroughly confused – view holds that Italy, in particular, still has to go through 
the wage deflation Germany has already accomplished (see Bibow 2006b). While a deutschmark 
revaluation is clearly not an option any more, note that internal balance could also be restored by 
raising the German wage level accordingly – which highlights that German corporate profits are at 
issue. Neither course will do anything to address the aggregate demand deficiency in the eurozone.    20
current account imbalances allegedly do not matter any more. Yet, do not overlook 
that with Spain’s public budget roughly in balance an important implication is that 
Spain’s fast deteriorating international investment position is driven by private sector 
financial deficits of corresponding magnitude.  
True, some part of this imbalance may have its counterpart in Germans 
acquiring vacation domiciles in Spain. And another part is in the form of equity flows 
which supposedly serve as an equilibrating mechanism within the union. But 
especially the private debt structures involved, which represent the bulk of Spain’s 
external imbalance, imply a corresponding rise in foreign exposures to rising debt 
levels and asset prices in Spain. This raises the risk of contagion through the financial 
system in case of an asset price slump and debt crisis that may seem local at first.  
In this context, it is worthwhile to recall the unresolved lender-of-last-resort 
issue in Euroland. This issue, in turn, is inherently related to the “unprecedented 
divorce between the main monetary and fiscal authorities” in Euroland emphasized by 
Goodhart (1998, p. 3). This is not to suggest that Spain is the only eurozone country 
where property market developments, in particular, have given rise to some concern. 
In fact, there are other examples where asset price developments seem to have 
decoupled from the real economy. And there are of course examples among the new 
EU members with even larger external imbalances. But Spain is of particular interest: 
with foreign exposures to private credit risks in Spain soaring, the competitiveness 
channel is predicted to “eventually become the dominating adjustment factor” (ECB 
2005) – while the nominal exchange rate can play no part in all this! 
  In summary, sole reliance on the competitiveness channel, that is, on wage-
price flexibility as well as structural reforms intended to enhance their flexibility, 
ignores important forces of divergence that tend to depress domestic demand in the 
deflating country. In addition, to the extent that the deflating country’s 
competitiveness actually improves, export success will come through spreading its 
problems to trading partners. These will get dragged down through deteriorating 
export performance and likely experience a build-up of external imbalances; which 
will unravel at some point.
8  
  The two key flaws in Europe’s official flexibility doctrine featuring wage-
price flexibility and the competitiveness channel may thus be pinpointed. One is to 
                                                 
8 Nonetheless many observers today appear to be even surprised that the “eurozone fails to match 
Germany’s revival” (FT.com, 1 February 2006).    21
ignore Keynes’s chapter 19 insight that wage flexibility essentially means monetary 
policy conducted by the trade unions. The other is to ignore that Mundell focused on 
the competitiveness channel specifically in the context of asymmetric shocks.  
As to the first flaw, recall Keynes’s conclusion in chapter 19 that money wage 
flexibility may be both less effective as well as riskier than stable wage inflation 
combined with deliberate stabilizing monetary policies by a competent central bank. 
The point is that downward wage flexibility effectively works through forcing 
expansionary monetary policy upon the central bank; apart from whatever net exports  
this strategy might elicit through the competitiveness channel. The trouble is that this 
may not work for a large economy with a slow central bank, either because the 
economy slips into deflation before the central bank dares to act or because factors 
other than wages keep up inflation and thereby forestall monetary easing.  
The latter case best describes developments in the eurozone as a whole. The 
budgetary consequences of stagnation led to a sizeable upward distortion in headline 
inflation as finance ministers raised indirect taxes and administered prices in view of 
their ongoing struggle with the SGP. Bibow (2006a) identified the resulting “tax-
push” inflation as a symptom of ill-guided macroeconomic policies that have caused 
macroeconomic fragility in the eurozone as a whole. The value added of the analysis 
in this paper was to investigate the forces of divergence at work when a large member 
country like Germany follows the flexibility prescription. The point is that the 
competitiveness channel is not the only channel at work and that in large economies 
the overall effect may be to destabilize the deflating economy, apart from spreading 
domestic problems to partners and causing divergences within the union.   
  As to the second flaw, do not miss that Mundell’s OCA was about asymmetric 
shocks that resulted in demand imbalances while overall effective demand was not 
deficient. Under such circumstances, it is true that the playing out of the forces of 
divergence highlighted in the above analysis may be an inevitable part of any re-
adjustment. So a vital point is that the “2001 global slowdown” was first of all in the 
nature of a common shock, a shock which therefore required a common response 
boosting depressed overall demand. Reliance on the competitiveness channel under 
such circumstances does not at all foster any mutually beneficial rebalancing of 
overall demand, but represents a beggar-thy-neighbor policy plain and simple; only 
that the policy’s intricate workings may not be so plain and simple, owing to the   22
complex forces of divergence involved in the process.
9 It was only through the 
working of these forces of divergence within the framework of the Maastricht regime 
that the originally symmetric shock attained its asymmetric characteristics as well.  
 
7. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
The analysis in this paper has identified important forces of divergence that are 
inherent in the working of the Maastricht regime of EMU. Featuring the supposedly 
equilibrating role of wage-price flexibility, it is shown that detrimental effects are to 
be expected both for larger countries relying on their working and the union as a 
whole. The official flexibility doctrine therefore offers misguided advice in stressing 
the role of the competitiveness channel in rebalancing divergences in economic 
activity and inflation, as experienced across the eurozone since 2001. Official advice 
ignores fundamental insights of Keynes and Mundell.  
For the eurozone as a whole Keynes taught us that downward wage flexibility 
can only work through inducing timely and well-measured monetary easing; which is 
anathema to the “stability-oriented” mindset and approach ruling at the ECB. 
Otherwise this strategy is a risky one as it can lead to either stagflation (as occurred 
since 2001) or even outright deflation. For a large economy like Germany’s, for 
instance, downward wage-price flexibility triggers powerful adverse domestic 
channels that can for long over-compensate the competitiveness channel, fostering 
fragility as well as divergence and the build-up of imbalances along the way.  
No less important is the fact that Mundell stressed the competitiveness channel 
as rebalancing two countries that were hit by an asymmetric shock. By contrast, when 
the “2001 global slowdown” hit the eurozone, this was originally a symmetric or 
common shock that required a common policy response – which was not forthcoming. 
This policy failure occurred due to crucial flaws in the Maastricht regime – a failure 
that cannot be rectified by then relying on the competitiveness channel instead. For in 
case of symmetric shocks the working of the competitiveness channel will not be of a 
mutually beneficial kind at all, but represent beggar-thy-neighbor instead. This is a 
                                                 
9 Whereas Mundell (1961) focused on asymmetric (demand-shift) shocks, Friedman’s (1953) case for 
flexible exchange rates was inspired by the idea that this would free macroeconomic policymaking to 
focus on internal balance; following Keynes (1923) of course. By contrast, the Maastricht regime is 
about apparent macroeconomic policy abstention – a thoroughly fallacious idea indeed.     23
recipe not for rebalancing, but for undermining the euro. It is invoking what EMU 
was supposed to ban forever – competitive devaluations.  
  It thus reflects flawed thinking to assume that structural reforms are the 
answer to the current situation and to assert that a more flexible eurozone economy 
might cope better with the same kind of shocks next time round. Union-wide 
downward wage flexibility raises the risk of deflation, a sure recipe for disaster in 
conjunction with a slow-to-ease central bank. If downward wage flexibility in 
Germany alone were enhanced, the above analyzed forces might work faster – albeit 
with unclear ramifications! – but the beggar-thy-neighbor character of the strategy 
would not change. At best, enhanced two-way [sic!] wage-price flexibility might 
speed up the rebalancing of countries through the competitiveness channel in a 
mutually beneficial way in response to properly asymmetric shocks of the demand-
shift type, although the forces of divergence operative within the Maastricht regime 
that were identified above remain relevant even then.  
  The bottom line is that micro flexibility is no substitute for proper aggregate 
demand management and structural reform of markets no substitute for reforming the 
flawed Maastricht regime of EMU. The Maastricht regime fosters divergence as well 
as fragility. The latter problem arises because no one is keeping the domestic demand 
store – unless the ECB chooses to do so. And the former problem is bound to even 
worsen with and reinforce aggregate fragility, especially in case of ill-guided reliance 
on the competitiveness channel as a substitute for appropriately designed policies 
addressing, as the case may be, common shocks and/or asymmetric shocks and 
divergences.  
  Apart from the macroeconomic policy regime reforms I suggested elsewhere 
(Bibow 2003), I recommend that wage inflation in the larger economies need to be 
aligned, both for their own good as well as in view of the sustainability of EMU. By 
coordinated effort a stable long-run (4-5 percent) trend of wage inflation should be 
established, with persistent divergences in productivity trends and external imbalances 
justifying deviations from the established wage norm. For smaller countries the 
situation is somewhat different because in their case (due to a greater degree of 
openness) the competitiveness channel might dominate the domestic channel (with its   24
inherent forces of divergence) even in the short run.
10 Yet, while wage-price 
flexibility can thus play a stabilizing role in their case, there should be safeguards in 
place against using this route in a free-riding way, that is, at the expense of partners. 
Again, external positions might provide guidance on tolerated deviations from the 
wage norm.  
  Finally, since throughout the analysis it was largely ignored that the eurozone 
is part of an increasingly integrated global economy, let me add here that it is not 
advisable for the world’s second largest economic area to rely on the competitiveness 
channel (vis-à-vis the rest of the world) as its growth engine. Especially in view of 
mounting global imbalances this is a high-risk strategy (Kregel 1999).  
Luckily, since 2003 and until today a very favorable global environment has 
helped to offset the Maastricht regime’s deflationary bias. Arguably, Germany has 
been the greatest beneficiary of all – the export world champion whose trade surplus 
dwarfs that of China. The real test will only come when Germany and the eurozone 
can no longer freeload on external stimuli. A serious risk is that a United States 
slowdown will prompt U.S. dollar weakness. And it is true that a rising euro together 
with falling oil prices can have a strongly deflationary impact. Whether their 
deflationary impact will boost domestic demand sufficiently to offset the external 
demand weakening that is likely to trigger these events, as some seem to hope, 
remains to be seen though.   
                                                 
10 The “Dutch miracle” of the 1980s and 90s is a case in point here; a miracle ending in boom and bust 
though as the bigger neighbor retaliated by wage deflation. See also Fritsche et al. 1999 and Hein and 
Truger 2005.    25
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